ARENDT'S REVISION OF PRAXIS: ON PLURALITY AND NARRATIVE EXPERIENCE
Hannah Arendt's relationship to phenomenology is inseparable from a reinterpretation of philosophical sources that culminates in a compelling vision of political life. While Arendt's phenomenological orientation has been noted in various scholarly works, her actual achievement testifies to a creative approach to traditional concerns that often assumes the form of a dialogue with her more immediate intellectual predecessors. The purpose of this paper is to examine the central role of praxis in Arendt's conception of the human world and the structure of political life as a site of subjective interaction and narrative discourse. First, Arendt's use of Aristotle will be presented in terms of the meaning of action as a unique philosophical category. Second, Arendt's encounter with the work of Martin Heidegger will be shown to involve a critical response to his reading of Aristotle. Finally, the revised conception of praxis that derives from her philosophical reflections will be related to the experience of narrative as a necessary complement to human plurality.
I
One of Arendt's most important contributions to philosophical discussion concerns her insistence that the Western intellectual tradition has largely effaced the meaning of action as a unique human category. This effacement has its origins in the philosophies of both Plato and Aristotle, which in different ways have subordinated the active life to a predominantly contemplative mode of being. This tendency is perhaps more clearly announced in traditional Platonism as a basically anti-political attempt to subordinate action to thought than it is reflected in Aristotle's view of political life. However, Arendt's survey of Western philosophy from Plato to Heidegger is informed by a basic insight that this tradition is largely engaged in placing the faculty of the will under the authority of the intellect and in denying a creative role to spontaneity and inaugural acts in political experience. At the same time, her careful reading of Aristotle demonstrates that the fundamental difference between praxis and poe : isis can be used to challenge both intellectualism and the more recent philosophical tendency to simply discard the will as an outmoded concept.
Arendt's rethinking of praxis is related to the more immediate task of delimiting the space of the political as the public realm in which human beings can act in concert in order to define themselves in historical terms. In T he Human Condition, Arendt argues that the distinction between public and private realms can be described phenomenologically as sites in which qualitatively different activities are organized and carried out according to specific goals. The basis for this distinction can be traced back to the classical belief in immortality, which can be related to the fact that man alone is a mortal being.1 The possibility that human beings can survive in words and deeds underlies the quest for immortality. The space peculiar to this quest is the sphere of freedom from necessity which in principle enables human beings to act in a common world. The private realm, in contrast, is primarily identified with the affairs of the household and involves mastering the needs of life through economic management. From this standpoint, Arendt can oppose the brightness of the public realm to the relative darkness of the household. And yet, this option is not rigid, since the public realm requires private mastery in order to function in a secure manner. For Arendt, the term 'public' refers to the world itself, which can be related to all of the enduring artifacts fabricated by human hands and the many affairs that compose human experience.2
This distinction between the two realms largely governs Arendt's reflections on the Greek example, but it acquires a deeper meaning when related to the phenomenon of action as clarified in the ethical and political writings of Aristotle. The failure of modern society to maintain the autonomy of the political was no doubt the occasion that motivated Arendt to return to classical precedent in clarifying the difference between praxis and poe : isis, or action and making. In blurring this difference, modern society begins to replace the political realm of freedom with an instrumentalist culture that predicates utility as the highest value. For Arendt, this unfortunate development is no accident but becomes the late expression of basic tendencies that were implicit in Western metaphysics from the outset. Aristotle's concept of actuality (energeia) pertains to all activities that do not pursue an extrinsic end and that leave no work behind. Such activities do not operate in terms of the categories of means and ends, since ''the means to achieve the end would already be the end,'' and the end cannot be viewed as instrumental to some higher goal.3 Arendt's conception of politics as basically performative is based on a qualitative distinction between purposive action and productive activity that is Aristotelian in origin.
